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INTRODUCTION
As President Lyndon B. Johnson remarked in a message to Con-
gress, in a democracy, "the right to vote is the most basic right of
all."' Yet the path to the American ballot box has been anything but
straightforward. For centuries, minorities and women were denied a
voice in elections. It took the Civil War to secure passage of the Fif-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibited
the state and federal governments from restricting the right to vote
based on race;2 it took more than a century for the substance of this
amendment to be realized. 3 After decades of grassroots movements for
women's suffrage, the Nineteenth Amendment finally granted voting
rights to women in 1920.4 By that time, all adults over twenty-one
years of age could legally vote,5 although state and federal legislation
encumbered this right throughout the twentieth century by preventing
qualified voters from casting a ballot. 6
One illustrative episode of such hindrances arose during World
War II. Traditional methods of voting were unavailable to the Ameri-
can soldiers drafted into the military as well as to the women who
served in auxiliary corps or volunteer organizations, such as the Red
1. Special Message to Congress: "To Vote at Eighteen-Democracy Fulfilled and
Enriched," I Pun. PAPERs 751 (June 27, 1968). As 2015 marked the seventieth anni-
versary of V-E (Victory in Europe) and V-J (Victory over Japan) Days, it is a timely
occasion to revisit a chapter of history that has been largely ignored, but that was
formative in the development of voting rights in America.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
3. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10702 (2014)). As recently as 2000, the Supreme
Court struck down a Hawaiian state voting provision because it violated the Fifteenth
Amendment. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). Under Hawaiian state law,
prospective voters were required to attest that they were "Hawaiian" in order to be-
come registered voters. See id. at 499. The Supreme Court held that this law abridged
the right to vote on account of race. The Court stated, "The purpose and command of
the Fifteenth Amendment are set forth in language both explicit and comprehensive.
The National Government and the States may not violate a fundamental principle:
They may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race." Id. at 511-12.
The Supreme Court invalidated section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") in
2013. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). This section dictated the formu-
las for the Justice Department's enforcement of the VRA. See id. at 2619. The Court
invited Congress to update the formulas that determine which jurisdictions are cov-
ered under the VRA, but Congress has yet to do so.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex.").
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
6. The poll tax and in-person registration requirements are two examples of re-
strictions placed on voting in the twentieth century. See infra note 8 and accompany-
ing text; see also discussion infra Section II.D.
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Cross. Removed from their homes to train and serve overseas, if they
were to vote at all it would be by absentee ballot. However, many
states did not have absentee voter laws, and those that did had not
created them with an eye to the novel circumstances posed by war-
time.7 For example, many states required that new voters register in
person, yet it would have been impossible for tens of thousands of
Americans in the services to travel home to satisfy this condition.8 To
avoid disenfranchising the millions of people serving the nation, state
and federal legislators needed to create laws that would ensure a
meaningful opportunity to cast an absentee ballot. After all, it seemed
undemocratic to politically silence those in uniform.
Under the belief that the task could not be left to the states, Con-
gress set out in 1942 to create a simple absentee ballot to be used by
anyone who left their home to serve the nation.9 Yet, holding elections
and counting votes were activities traditionally reserved to the states,
and some representatives and senators bitterly fought the federal vot-
ing bill, accusing Congress of trespassing on state sovereignty.' 0
Many a day's debate ended in an impasse, and it seemed Congress,
would never pass voting legislation because sectional hostilities and
prejudices cloaked in the guise of "states' rights" overpowered notions
of democracy and universal suffrage.
The fight for the soldier vote implicated a complicated intersec-
tion of constitutional principles: state sovereignty, Congress's author-
ity over federal elections, and Congress's war powers.II While the
7. See 88 CONG. Rjic. 7069 (1942) (stating that only one of the forty-eight states
had an "adequate" absentee voting law that would enable Americans displaced from
their homes to cast a ballot in the upcoming midterm election).
8. See id. at 6928 (discussing the requirement of many states that a person must
register to vote in person); id. at 6549 (discussing how soldiers who turned twenty-
one years old after entering the service would not have "an opportunity to register in
their home districts").
9. In the end, a law was passed, but it was largely ineffective. See Soldier Voting
Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-712, 56 Stat. 753 (originally titled "An Act to provide for
a method of voting, in time of war, by members of the land and naval forces absent
from the place of their residence") (amended 1944).
10. For example, during the debates for the 1942 soldier voting bill, one representa-
tive insisted that there "never has been a Federal election held nor a Federal vote
cast," because the states had always possessed the power to hold elections and count
ballots. 88 CONG. Risc. 7055 (1942). The same representative continued: "Never
before in history has the Congress pretended to legislate on such a subject. Never
before has this citadel of States' rights been so attacked. Never before has such usur-
pation been attempted." Id.
I1. See U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."); id. art. I, § 4, cl. I ("The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
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U.S. Constitution allocated the bulk of election duties to the states, it
also sanctioned Congress's involvement in governing elections under
certain circumstances.1 2 But where did the authority of the states end
and Congress's powers begin? Did the federal government have the
power to pass legislation to ensure that elections for federal offices
would not be impaired? Several factors weighed in favor of Congress
becoming involved. First, most state absentee voter laws were un-
workable in wartime.' 3 Second, it seemed natural for the federal gov-
ernment to legislate the logistics of absentee voting because the War
and Navy Departments shouldered the duties of distributing ballots
and hosting elections in training camps and at overseas posts.1 4 Third,
as a practical matter, Congress was better positioned to create one
mechanism for absentee voting, which seemed preferable to forty-
eight conflicting and unique state voting procedures.15 There was a
constant tension between what many believed Congress ought to do,
and what Congress could constitutionally do.
All legislators could agree in principle that soldiers should have
an opportunity to vote. Many of the senators and representatives who
voted for the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, which im-
plemented the draft and caused millions of Americans to enter the
armed services, were the same men and women who felt duty-bound
to provide Americans in the armed forces with a method of voting in
the 1942 and 1944 elections.1 6 Yet, wartime voting became a partisan,
by the Legislature thereof; but Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."); id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11
(granting Congress the power to "declare War"); id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14 (granting Con-
gress the power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces").
12. Compare id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the
Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature."), with id. art. 1, § 4, cl. I ("The Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but Congress may at any time by
Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
13. 88 CONG. Ri-c. 6547 (1942) (acknowledging that the only state with an ade-
quate absentee voting law was New York).
14. 90 CONG. REc. 608 (1944) (discussing how the War and Navy Departments had
informed Congress that "it would almost stop the war if they had to deliver all the
ballots from the 48 different States under the 48 different procedures they have").
15. Id. at 607 (discussing the need for a universal federal ballot because the federal
government "cannot furnish to the troops in every part of the world all the different
types and kinds of ballots which are required by the 48 States, which have enacted 48
different kinds of election procedures").
16. Pub. L. No. 76-783, § 2, 54 Stat. 885, 885 (providing that "every male citizen of
the United States . . . who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent
registration, is between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six, [shall] present himself
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divisive issue. It pitted Republicans against Democrats, and some
southerners against legislators who were resistant to race-based re-
strictions on voting. Diehard states' rights advocates bitterly resisted
the expansion of federal powers, some maintaining that the sanctity of
the Constitution was up for grabs. Throughout the debates, legislators
would be reminded of the consequences of their dissension. It
threatened to deprive one of the most cherished cornerstones of de-
mocracy for the population of Americans who were risking their lives
to preserve this very form of government. In the words of one repre-
sentative, to pass a mucked-up bill that did not provide a meaningful
opportunity to vote would be "a deception ... against our soldiers and
sailors."' 7
This Article explores the legal and constitutional issues that
plagued the passage of the Soldier Voting Acts of 1942 and 1944. It is
composed of three Parts. The first analyzes the 1942 Soldier Voting
Act and explores the congressional handiwork that led to a voter turn-
out of less than one percent of all servicepeople in the 1942 election., 8
Regardless of whether one was from a red or blue state, all agreed this
was a civil rights travesty. The second Part will explore the 1944 Sol-
dier Voting Act, which was supposed to remedy and amend the 1942
bill, boost absentee voting, and provide a simple mechanism for those
in the services to cast a ballot. Instead, both sides of the aisle worked
to manipulate the ballot in order to secure a certain outcome in the
election: Democrats strove to create a ballot that would favor
Roosevelt, while Republicans worked to make voting for Roosevelt as
difficult as possible. After endless rounds of concessions and amend-
ments, the final version of the 1944 soldier voting law was, in the
words of one representative, "as clear as mud."' 9 Once again, voter
turnout amongst those in the services was extraordinarily low. The
third Part explores how the shortcomings in the 1942 and 1944 soldier
voting laws were eventually remedied to some extent during the post-
war years.
for and submit to registration" for military service); see, e.g., 86 CONG. REC. 12,160
(1940) (roll call for the vote on the Selective Training and Service Act).
17. 90 CONG. Ritc. 2630 (1944).
18. The National World War 11 Museum estimates that approximately four million
servicemen were in the armed services in 1942. See By the Numbers: The US Military,
NAT'L WORD) WAR 11 MusE-uM, http://www.nationalww2museum.orgleameduca-
tion/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by-the-numbers/us-military.htmi (last visited Feb.
22, 2016). Of these four million men, only twenty-eight thousand cast votes in the
1942 election. See C.P. Trussell, Both Sides Press Bids for 1944 Service Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1943, at E9.
19. 90 CONG. Ri-c. 2638 (1944).
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I.
THE 1942 SOLDIER VOTING ACT
A. Conscripting Millions
As war raged in Europe in 1940, President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt faced a conundrum. The size of the United States military
was skeletal, and yet the possibility that the nation would be forced to
join the war could not be ignored. 20 The recently invented Gallup Poll
revealed that, as of June 1940, only about seven percent of Americans
were in favor of an immediate declaration of war against Germany. 2 1
While the President knew that proactive legislation was needed to pre-
pare America for the possibility of war, he faced a populace infected
with a virulent sense of isolationism, the roots of which had grown
deep following World War I and the all-encompassing economic dis-
aster the nation faced during the Great Depression. 22 Throughout the
summer of 1940, Congress drafted conscription legislation. President
Roosevelt publicly endorsed the anticipated bill-"I am in favor of a
selective training bill and I consider it essential to adequate national
defense," he said in August 1940.23 Roosevelt explained that conscrip-
tion was a necessary measure-even in the absence of a declaration of
war-because it would be impossible for the United States to train and
mobilize an army only after it joined the conflict.2 4 In support, he
noted that it took the United States thirteen-and-a-half months to pre-
pare its army for World War I and emphasized that the United States
could not afford such a delay in readying itself for another war. 2 5
In September 1940, Congress passed the Selective Training and
Service Act, which required that all men between twenty-one and
thirty-six years of age register for military service. 26 It was an unprec-
edented measure: never before had the United States held a peacetime
20. See JOHN JAMIESON, BOOKS FOR THE ARMy: THE ARMy LIBRARY SERVICE IN
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 20 (1950) (estimating that 174,000 men were in the Army
before conscription).
21. See Hadley Cantril, Impact of the War on the Nation's Viewpoint, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 1940, at 67.
22. See RAOUL_ DE RouSSY DE SALEs, THE MAKING OF TOMORROw 5 (1942) (ob-
serving that the United States maintained an isolationist foreign policy during the
"boom years and the depression"); see also JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., BREAKING
THE HEART OF THE WORLD 11, 228-29, 395 (2001).
23. See Charles Hurd, Need of Men Vital, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1940, at 1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, § 2, 54 Stat.
885, 885. The registration requirement was later expanded to include all male citizens
of the United States between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five. See Proclamation
No. 2597, 8 Fed. Reg. 14,595 (Oct. 28, 1943).
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draft.27 The Act empowered the President of the United States to in-
duct "such number of men as in his judgment is required," and each
inductee was obligated to serve a twelve-month period that could be
extended if the "interests of national defense" required it.28 On Octo-
ber 29, 1940, President Roosevelt addressed the nation before the first
draft numbers were drawn. "This is a most solemn ceremony," he be-
gan. "It is accompanied by no fanfare, no blowing of bugles or beating
of drums, and there should be none." 29 Reluctantly, the nation was
preparing for war. "We are well aware of the circumstances, the tragic
circumstances, in lands across the sea which have forced upon our
nation the need to take measures of total defense," the President re-
minded the public. 30 That same day, Roosevelt gravely sat beside a
blindfolded Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and watched as Stim-
son pulled numbers from a fishbowl to establish the order in which
Americans would be inducted into the armed services.3 I Around the
country, Americans listened to radio coverage of the draft. "'This is
the first lottery I ever won in my life,' several jokingly complained" as
their numbers were selected. 32 Although Election Day was less than
one week away, and some thought the timing of the draft would cost
Roosevelt the election, Roosevelt instead became the first to ever
serve a third term as President. 33
Initially, only eight hundred thousand of more than sixteen mil-
lion registrants were called to serve from 1940 to 1941.34 After the
attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the pace of conscription
accelerated. By the summer of 1942, almost four million Americans
had donned a military uniform, and this number was on the rise.3 5
After a thirteen-week basic training regimen, these Americans were
27. See DORIs KEARNs GooowIN, No ORDINARY TIME. FRANKLIN AND ELEANOR
RoosuvEaT: THE HOME FRONT IN WORlD WAR II 186 (1994).
28. Selective Training and Service Act § 3.
29. Radio Address on the Occasion of the Drawing of Numbers Under the Selective
Service Act of 1940, 1940 Pul. PAPERs 510 (Oct. 29, 1940).
30. Id. at 510-11.
31. See GooDwIN, supra note 27, at 186; see also CONRAD BLACK, FRANKI.IN DEL-
ANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM 592-93 (2003).
32. GOODWIN, supra note 27, at 187.
33. Id. at 189. Despite his win, the election returns were closer than President
Roosevelt would have liked. He claimed 54.7% of the vote to Wendell Willkie's
44.8%. Id.
34. Radio Address on the Occasion of the Drawing of Numbers Under the Selective
Service Act of 1940, 1940 Pun. PAPERS 510 (Oct. 29, 1940). To make these numbers
sound more palatable, the White House explained that "more than 95 per cent of the
grand total [of registrants] are not to be called, and less than 5 per cent are to be." Id.
at 512.
35. By the Numbers: The US Military, supra note 18.
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considered ready for warfare and shipped out to locations around the
world.36 With the November 1942 midterm elections on the horizon,
the need to ensure that these troops could vote became a crucial issue.
B. The Initial Bill
In June 1942, the House of Representatives considered a bill "[t]o
provide a method of voting, in time of war, by members of the land
and naval forces absent from the States of their residence and serving
within the continental United States." 37 This legislation provided that
every man who was qualified to vote and displaced from his home due
to military service, was entitled to a war ballot. It placed the onus on
each state's secretary of state to print and supply soldiers with war
ballots listing the candidates running for federal, state, and local of-
fices.38 The process to cast a vote had three parts. First, the Army was
to provide its men with postal cards to be mailed to the secretary of
state of their place of residence to request a ballot. Second, the secre-
tary of state was to then mail a ballot along with an oath to be signed
by the solider affirming that he was a citizen of that state and a quali-
fied voter. And third, the soldier would then return a completed oath
and ballot. If the soldier was a qualified voter under the relevant state
standards and the ballot was received by the deadline set by his home
state, his vote would be counted.39
Most legislators backed the principle of the bill: providing Amer-
icans in the armed services with the right to vote. Many agreed that
the federal government-and not just the states-should be involved
in devising an absentee voting scheme when the Army and Navy
would be called upon to execute it. As Democratic Representative
Robert Ramsay explained to his colleagues:
It is true that many of the States have absentee balloting, but it is
also true that there are States, I believe six or seven, that do not
have absentee balloting at elections. . . . I want to call . . . attention
. . . to the fact that the law in Mississippi has absentee voting for
primaries only but not for the general elections at all. Even down in
the State of Kentucky, there is no absentee vote, and in many States
they do have certain rules, but they are cumbersome and it cannot
be done satisfactorily. In my own State we have had absentee bal-
loting for years, but it is nearly impossible to make the affidavit
that you are going to be absent and get your affidavit in time to
36. Meyer Berger, American Soldier-One Year After, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1941,
at SM29.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 77-2265, at 1 (1942).
38. 88 CONG. REc. 6547 (1942) (discussing the general workings of the bill).
39. Id.
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vote. Our ballot is not sent out until 10 days before election and it
must be back home 5 days before the election. . . . Many of the
States are in a like situation. 40
Representative Ramsay argued that, at a time when Americans were
being drafted into military service-sometimes against their will-
and were fighting to preserve democracy, the slipshod absentee voting
laws of the states needed to be reformed. There needed to be a federal
voting bill.
But, the initial bill was plagued by shortcomings. It limited ab-
sentee voting to men who were drafted and sent to training camps
outside their home state. 4 1 But what about soldiers who were drafted
and assigned to training camps within their home state, but hundreds
of miles from their polling place? These men were absent from their
homes, could not travel to their home district to cast a vote, but were
unable to cast an absentee ballot because they were not absent from
their state of residence. The bill also provided no voting mechanism
for Americans who were serving overseas. 4 2 Another oversight was
that the initial bill applied only to men. It ignored the hundreds of
thousands of women who left their homes to volunteer to serve in
auxiliary corps, the Red Cross, and other wartime organizations. 43 It
also did not address how those who had recently turned twenty-one
years old could register to vote when most state voting laws required
prospective voters to register in person."
Over the following months, the bill bounced back and forth be-
tween the Senate and the House of Representatives, as each chamber
added amendments that only seemed to delay the bill's passage and
complicate the process of casting a ballot. There were some matters
40. Id. at 6546-47.
41. Id. at 6563.
42. Id. at 7058.
43. Id. at 6558 (discussing the bill's applicability to women serving the nation); see
also EMnY YELLN, OUR MOTHE-RS' WAR: AMERICAN WoMEN AT HOME AND AT THE
FRONT DURING WORLD WAR II 115 (2004). Members of the Women's Army Auxil-
iary Corps ("WAACs") and the Women Airforce Service Pilots ("WASPs") were not
actually considered members of the Army; rather, they were considered "civilians
serving with the Army." Id. Thus, these women were deprived of Army benefits due
to their "civilian" status. In 1943, the Army relented and granted women serving as
WAACs or WASPs full military status. Id. at 116.
44. Both West Virginia and Indiana required would-be voters to register in person.
See 88 CONG. REc. 6550 (1942) (noting that the state of West Virginia required each
individual to "present himself or herself personally before he can vote"); id. at 6552
("In my own state of Indiana, in order to register, a person must personally present
himself or herself to the registration officer, there sign the registration card and there
identify himself or herself, and these boys in the service have never had that
opportunity.").
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that met little opposition, such as amending the bill to include women
who left their homes to serve the nation.4 5 Providing no mechanism
for overseas absentee voting also generated little debate, primarily be-
cause the War Department insisted it would be impossible to effect. In
a letter to Congress, the War Department explained that the "shipment
of the supplies of applications for ballots (post cards), the return to the
various secretaries of states of the executed applications, thence the
carrying of the blank ballots and instructions to the voters, and the
return of the executed ballots from the several theaters of operations
overseas would present a tremendous problem."4 6 As it was already
September, and mail service overseas was notoriously slow, there was
insufficient time to effect three consecutive overseas mailings.4 7 Plus,
this three-part system did not take into account the fact that the Army
was constantly moving, and many soldiers would not be stationed in
the same place as when they originally requested a ballot. The time,
effort, and sheer magnitude of the task of achieving successful over-
seas voting would, in Stimson's words, "impede military functions." 48
Most members of Congress were willing to accept the War Depart-
ment's position at face value, and there was little debate about ex-
tending the reach of the voting bill to those serving overseas.49
45. The amendment read:
In time of war . . . every individual absent from the place of his
residence and serving in the land or naval forces of the United States in
the continental United States (excluding Alaska), including the members
of the Army Nurse Corps, the Navy Nurse Corps, the Women's Navy
Reserve, and the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, who is or was eligible
to register for and is otherwise qualified to vote ... shall be entitled ... to
vote ....
Id. at 6923.
46. Id. at 7058 (quoting Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson's letter to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives). Stimson noted that it was public knowledge that the
Army was already struggling to fulfill the basic needs of servicemen: "[W]e do not
have available at this time sufficient transportation facilities to carry our forces, weap-
ons, munitions, foods, medicines and other essential supplies overseas." Id. Merely
keeping up with mail had become such a strain that the Army had resorted to the
"microfilming of V-mail" to decrease the "bulk and weight" of such mail by about
ninety-eight percent. Id. As the voting procedure called for by the federal bill would
require servicemen to mail an application, affidavit, and war ballot, the voting proce-
dure would place a significant burden on the already overburdened overseas mail sys-
tem. Id.
47. Id. ("[T]he time is now so short that there is a grave question that the vari-
ous operations essential to carrying out the provisions of the bill could be
completed . .
48. Id.
49. Id. at 7096 (accepting that Americans overseas would not be provided an absen-
tee ballot in the 1942 election). It is rather extraordinary that the disenfranchisement
of millions of Americans overseas produced so little debate in Congress after they had
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C. State Sovereignty Concerns
Voter registration and the poll tax were two hotly debated issues.
Objections to the bill on these grounds were centered on the sover-
eignty of the states to prescribe voter qualifications. To some legisla-
tors, the bill seemed to interlope on each state's right to determine
who was qualified to cast a ballot. As a representative from Alabama
put it: "Congress has no more right in this field of legislation than it
has to govern Mars."5 0 But, state offices were not the only positions at
stake in the upcoming election. Federal legislators also bickered over
whether the states had the exclusive power to control the methods and
regulations governing elections for federal offices. Could states, by
failing to pass adequate absentee voter laws, disenfranchise voters in
federal elections?
Much of the debate involved two provisions of the Constitution
that seemed to place the states in competition with the federal govern-
ment over how an election would be held. Article I, Section 2, pro-
vided: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the
electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for elec-
tors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature." 5 ' While
most members of Congress could agree that this language meant that
voter "qualifications" were set by the states, disagreement abounded
over what constituted a "qualification." 52 Was registering to vote a
qualification? What about payment of a poll tax? Complicating mat-
ters was Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution, which stated: "The
times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Repre-
sentatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regula-
spent several months discussing the issue of expanding soldier absentee voting. See,
e.g., id. at 7072 (debating soldier voting in September 1942).
50. Id. at 7073. While some legislators knew that there were enough votes to pass
the bill, they still resisted the idea that the federal government would interlope on a
matter that belonged to the states. This issue often produced some of the most impas-
sioned diatribes. In the words of Alabama Representative Sam Hobbs, "[t]he people of
the States put us here to work for the mutual benefit of both themselves and their
Federal Government, not to kill their servants and offspring, the States." Id. He
deemed the federal voting bill to be "mob violence-lynch law!" Id. "You proponents
have the votes," he admitted, "but you have no right, on your side!" Id. He further
implied that the bill was criminal and indicted it for the "murder of the chief sover-
eignty of the States." Id.
51. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. I (emphasis added); see also 88 CONG. REc. 6547
(1942) (discussing the meaning of "qualifications" as used in Article 1).
52. 88 CONG. Risc. 6547 (1942).
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tions, except as to the places of chusing Senators."5 3 How Sections 2
and 4 were to be read together was disputed.5 4 If states could identify
the qualifications for voters, but Congress could alter state regulations
pertaining to voting, where did the rights of the states end and Con-
gress's authority begin? What was the difference between a "qualifica-
tion" and "regulation"?
Grabbing their dictionaries, representatives defined "qualifica-
tion" as "any quality . .. which fits a person for any .. . legal power or
ability," while "regulation" meant "the act of regulating; order;
method; rule." 5 5 Much like these definitions, case law interpreting the
Constitution was of little help, for there was a dearth of authority that
directly examined the difference between a "qualification" and a "reg-
ulation," or that carved a boundary between the powers of Congress
and the states to pass voting legislation. However, the Supreme Court
had held that Congress had some authority to govern elections. For
example, in an 1879 case, the Court examined Article I, Section 4, and
observed that there was "no declaration that [voting] regulations shall
be made either wholly by the State legislatures or wholly by Con-
gress. "56 Thus, the Court extrapolated that, "[i]f Congress does not
interfere, of course they may be made wholly by the State; but if it
chooses to interfere, there is nothing in the words to prevent its doing
so, either wholly or partially." 57
On the side of preserving states' rights to govern elections were
several vocal representatives from the South. Representative Edward
Cox, of Georgia, respected by those on both sides of the aisle for his
expertise as a trained lawyer, vehemently argued that the proposed bill
was unconstitutional and impermissibly stepped on the states' author-
ity to legislate voting.58 Relying upon a Wisconsin state court deci-
sion, Cox argued that the requirement that citizens register to vote was
a "condition precedent to the exercise of the franchise," and thus
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I (emphasis added).
54. 88 CONG. Ruc. 6547 (1942).
55. Id. (defining various terms for purposes of the debate).
56. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 383 (1879). During congressional debates, rep-
resentatives argued that Siebold established that Congress had authority to create vot-
ing regulations. 88 CONG. Ric. 6547 (1942).
57. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 383. The Supreme Court further explained that Congress
could "either make the regulations, or it may alter them. If it only alters, leaving, as
manifest convenience requires, the general organization of the polls to the State, there
results a necessary co-operation of the two governments in regulating the subject." Id.
Thus, the Supreme Court's view was that Congress had the prerogative to either act or
not, but if it did, the state and federal governments would have to cooperate to execute
the legislation of both levels of government.
58. 88 CONG. REc. 6548 (1942).
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"Congress cannot interfere" because it constituted a qualification. 59
He further noted that the poll tax, too, was a "qualification fixed by
the State which cannot be reached by any congressional act." 60 Back-
ing Cox's argument were vocal representatives from Mississippi and
Alabama. 61 They believed that in a time of "war or in emergency there
is no occasion for us, when we are fighting to preserve freedoms and
fighting for rights, to usurp the rights of the states." 62 They seemingly
ignored the danger of the states usurping voting rights by failing to
pass workable absentee ballot legislation.
Cox's view was met by overwhelming opposition. Many legisla-
tors were shocked that a federal official could argue that a soldier who
had recently reached his twenty-first birthday and had not had an op-
portunity to register to vote in his home district, should be disen-
franchised merely because he had been drafted into the United States
military. "[I]t seems to me," one representative remarked, "that the
least we can do is . .. give a vote to those who may die before they get
another chance to vote."63 "Who," asked another representative, "is
more entitled to cast his vote, who is better qualified to exercise his
right of franchise, than the men and boys who are offering their lives,
59. Id.; see State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71 (1875). This was a strange case for Repre-
sentative Cox to cite. Certainly, the Supreme Court's analysis in Siebold trumped the
language of a state case that preceded it. In addition, Baker addressed the issue of
whether certain votes, already cast in an election, should be counted when the voters
had not properly registered to vote due to the ineptitude of election inspectors. Baker,
38 Wis. at 74-75. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that these technically defective
votes could still be counted in the election. Id. at 89. It seems that Cox relied on this
case due to its interpretation of "registration" as constituting a "qualification." Id. at
86-87. This language would suggest that registration fell under the arm of the states
under Article 1, Section 4. The case, however, examines only the Wisconsin state
constitution-not the United States Constitution. Id.
60. 88 CONG. Ric. 6548 (1942).
61. Representatives Rankin and Whittington, both of Mississippi, attacked the pro-
posed federal voting bill on the grounds that it infringed on states' rights. See, e.g., id.
at 6543 (statement of Rep. Rankin) (deeming the bill "an effort to wipe out the elec-
tion laws of every State in the Union"); id. at 6555 (statement of Rep. Whittington)
(characterizing the franchise "a privilege ... that can be granted or withheld only by
the States"). Representative Hobbs, of Alabama, analogized the proposed bill to the
theft of a car. Id. at 6557-58. In his hypothetical scenario, a federal official tells
servicemen that he is so grateful for their willingness to lay down their lives for their
country that he wants them to enjoy a day off. Id. at 6557. The federal official invites
the servicemen to use a state-owned car for the day: "Take the car. It is full of gas. Go
out and have a good time. Enjoy yourselves," the federal official tells the servicemen.
Id. "We are enacting here today a parallel of that parable," said Representative Hobbs.
Id. at 6558.
62. Id. at 6564 (statement of Rep. Whittington).
63. Id. at 6558 (statement of Rep. Patrick).
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if necessary, to protect the freedom and our democratic way of
life . . ?"64
Those who supported the federal legislation did not need to rely
only on moral considerations. There was law on their side as well. For
instance, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Classic, held-after
considering the language of Article I, Sections 2 and 4 of the Constitu-
tion-that "a primary election which involves a necessary step in the
choice of candidates for election as representatives in Congress . . . is
subject to congressional regulation as to the manner of holding it."65
Classic took a step further, arguably in dicta:
Not only does § 4 of Article I authorize Congress to regulate
the manner of holding elections, but by Article I, § 8, Clause 18,
Congress is given authority "to make all laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers
and all other powers by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States or in any department or office thereof." 66
Surely, this authority emboldened legislators who wished to provide a
means for soldiers absent from their homes to register to vote from
afar.67
State case law provided further support for the argument that re-
gistration was not a "qualification" under Article I, Section 2. For ex-
ample, in Meffert v. Brown, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held
that the "act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not
one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter." 68 In
Hindman v. Boyd, the Supreme Court of Washington held that "regis-
tration is not an element entering into the definition of a qualified
voter."69 Other states with similar case law included Nebraska, Illi-
64. Id. at 6551 (statement of Rep. Rees).
65. 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941).
66. Id. This statement is arguably dicta, as the question in Classic was whether
Congress had the constitutional authority to regulate primary elections. After answer-
ing in the affirmative, the Supreme Court went a step further in its discussion of the
breadth of Congress's powers to regulate elections. See id.
67. See, e.g., 88 CONG. Ruc. 6551 (1942) (statements of Reps. Rees and Gwynne,
asserting that Congress did have the power to regulate elections).
68. 116 S.W. 779, 781 (Ky. 1909). The Court of Appeals of Kentucky went on to
observe that "[o]ne may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote.
Registering does not confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of
the right." Id.
69. 84 P. 609, 613 (Wash. 1906). The court continued: "It is held by eminent au-
thority that registration laws cannot be justly regarded as adding a new qualification to
those prescribed by the Constitution, but that they are merely reasonable and conve-
nient regulations prescribing the mode of exercising the right to vote." Id.
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nois, Kansas, and Iowa.70 These cases temporarily quelled debate; fed-
eral legislation would suspend state voter registration requirements.7'
D. The Poll Tax
A far more contentious issue took main stage when the poll tax
reared its head. After the post-Civil War Reconstruction period, all
eleven states that had formed the Confederacy instituted the poll tax as
a qualification for voting. 72 The connection between this tax and the
disenfranchisement of African Americans is well known. Although the
poll tax had previously been considered a state issue, some federal
legislators viewed the federal soldier voting law as an opportunity to
test whether the poll tax could be eliminated at the federal level.7 3 In a
surprising break with the usual solidarity among Southern states on
state sovereignty issues, Representative Kefauver, of Tennessee, an-
nounced that he wished to propose an amendment to the soldier voting
bill, one that would eliminate the payment of a poll tax by those dis-
placed from their homes to serve the nation. 74 Kefauver declared that
70. See Grinnell v. Hoffman, 5 N.E. 596, 608 (111. 1886) ("A registry law is merely
a mode of ascertaining and determining whether or not a man possesses the necessary
qualifications of a voter."); Edmonds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa 267, 268 (1869) (distin-
guishing registration from a qualification by explaining that the "name of plaintiff not
being on the register as provided by [the registration] statute, he was not permitted to
vote at said election, although, except for such omission of his name from the register,
defendants knew plaintiff to be a qualified voter"); State v. Butts, 2 P. 618 (Kan.
1884) (explaining that the state "constitution makes no attempt to make 'registration'
a necessary qualification, nor a failure to be duly registered as an elector a disqualifi-
cation," and that the Kansas Registration Act of 1879 was "obnoxious to the constitu-
tion" and void because it made registration a qualification); Steams v. Corner, 34
N.W. 499, 501 (Neb. 1887) (explaining that registration was not a qualification, but
was a "method of proving the existence of the qualifications required by the constitu-
tion" (emphasis omitted)).
71. Soldier Voting Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-712, § 1, 56 Stat. 753, 753
(amended 1944).
72. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES O
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 92-82, at 1587 (1973). These
states were: South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana,
Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, and Arkansas. See JAMES M. MCPHER-
SON, ORDEAL. By FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 131, 154 (2d ed. 1992)
(detailing the secession of the Southern states in 1861).
73. Representative Kefauver supported abolishing the poll tax for soldiers, and was
the only southern legislator to take this stance. 88 CONG. REC. 6553 (1942) (statement
of Rep. Kefauver). Other legislators later suggested removing the poll tax from the
Soldier Voting Act altogether, citing its controversial nature and suggesting that it
would be better addressed through other legislation. Id. at 6930 (arguing that bill
would be defeated if an amendment to abolish the poll tax was not removed from it).
74. Id. at 6553. Kefauver openly admitted that his "position on this bill and to some
similar matters is not in conformity with many of my colleagues from the South," and
that he felt "torn between two forces." Id.
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"if we feel that these boys are capable of serving on the battlefield to
protect us and our country, we ought to feel they are capable of voting
in an election without registration and without the payment of a poll
tax."7 5 Kefauver maintained that a poll tax was not a "qualification"
that the states could set. 7 6 The ability to pay a tax "does not make a
man more capable of voting than a man who happens not to buy a poll
tax," he averred.7 7
The amendment was met by a chorus of disapproval. Once again,
state sovereignty was the rallying cry for those who opposed the pro-
posed federal legislation.78 These legislators maintained that each state
had the ability to set its own qualifications for voting-a poll tax be-
ing one such qualification-and for a federal law to override that
power was sacrilege.7 9 Bolstering their argument was the Supreme
Court's relatively recent decision in Breedlove v. Suttles, which con-
sidered a Georgia statute that required every inhabitant of the state
between the ages of twenty-one and sixty to pay a poll tax of one
dollar. A failure to pay this tax resulted in the loss of the opportunity
to vote. 80 One Georgia voter challenged the state's poll statute as a
violation of federal law. 8 ' The Supreme Court disagreed. "To make
payment of poll taxes a prerequisite of voting is not to deny any privi-
lege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," the Court
observed. 82 After describing the holding of the case, one senator de-
clared: "The decision was obviously right, for the elector sought to be
qualified to vote in a State election without complying with State re-
quirements."8 3 Many in the House of Representatives agreed. In the




78. For example, one senator argued: "It seems to me that every .. . State ... has
the right to retain the tax if it chooses to do so. The very power to abrogate or do away
with a poll tax presupposes the right to have one if the States sees [sic] fit." Id. at
6931.
79. E.g., id. (statement of Sen. Connally).
80. 302 U.S. 277, 280 (1937).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 283. The Supreme Court noted that the "payment of poll taxes as a pre-
requisite to voting is a familiar and reasonable regulation long enforced in many
States and for more than a century in Georgia." Id. at 283-84. The Georgia poll tax
excluded payment by "females who do not register for voting." Id. at 279-80 (citing
section 92-108 of the Georgia Code). An argument was made that this exclusion vio-
lated the Nineteenth Amendment. See id. at 283-84. In response, the Supreme Court
stated that it was "fanciful to suggest that the Georgia law is a mere disguise under
which to deny or abridge the right of men to vote on account of their sex." Id. at 284.
83. 88 CONG. REC. 6932 (1942) (statement of Sen. Pepper); see also id. at 7089-91
(discussing the significance of Breedlove).
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under the Constitution will not appreciate their Representatives in
Congress surrendering the rights guaranteed to the States under the
Constitution." 84 Apparently, in the view of these legislators, the
soldiers would have preferred to lose their right to vote than to see
federal wartime legislation encroach on states' rights.
Some representatives grew impatient to pass voting legislation
rather than spend additional weeks entertaining arguments that would
lead only to further restrictions on voting. A few representatives ac-
cused their Southern colleagues of filibustering a necessary and per-
fectly legitimate piece of legislation simply because it would be
beneficial to some African Americans. As Tennessee Representative
John Jennings declared: "I am ready to believe . . . that the real pur-
pose . . . of the opposition to the enactment of this measure is to
continue to draw the bar . . . across the brow of the Negro citizens of
this Nation."8 5 He would not stand for this. "We have put them in our
armed forces, we have clothed them with the uniforms of our soldiers
and sailors," Jennings said. 86 "I say to you and I am willing to say to
everybody, that those men are citizens of this country, they are its
defenders, and they have the right to vote." 8 7 Representative Louis
Ludlow, of Indiana, agreed:
What a travesty it would be to send Negroes by the multiplied
thousands to the firing line to fight and die for freedom and then
tell them that they shall have no part or parcel in the freedom at
home which they are sworn to support and defend with their
lives.8 8
The idea that men drafted into military service to defend democracy
would be deprived of the right to vote seemed antithetical. As one
senator stated:
He is told, "We are sorry; you are a qualified soldier without pay-
ing [the poll tax], but not a qualified citizen without paying a sum
of money." Yet we are preaching ... the liberation of the oppressed
84. Id. at 6555 (statement of Rep. Whittington).
85. Id. at 6556.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 6556-57. Jennings was not the only legislator to pin the delay on racism.
Representative Vorys of Ohio boldly declared that certain Southern representatives
"are willing to delay giving our fighting men an opportunity to vote in order to hang
on to their systems of keeping Negroes from voting." Id. at 6552.
88. Id. at 7075. Ludlow further stated that he would consider himself "very derelict
in my duty if I did not raise my voice and my vote against such an unspeakable and
unmitigated injustice as that." Id.
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peoples of the world, and the emancipation of the subjected peoples
everywhere.89
To fight against Hitler (and, concomitantly, his views on racial
inequality) while tolerating voting policies that disenfranchised citi-
zens based on race, seemed the ultimate in hypocrisy.
Although there was a dearth of federal case law supporting their
position, and Breedlove definitively undermined them, legislators
favoring the suspension of the poll tax emphasized its disenfranchise-
ment of American soldiers of all races. Many state statutes required
that a poll tax be paid within a certain time period. 90 Thus, soldiers
from these states, stationed far from home, who likely lacked access to
the specific rules of their home states, would be required to timely
remit payment to exercise their right to vote.9 ' As one Senator
explained:
A man in the service of his country, busy with his chores and cares,
is expected, without notice or information, to be informed and
thoughtful enough to send to the proper official his poll tax money,
so that weeks or months thereafter, other circumstances permitting,
he will be qualified to vote in an election for the authority which
sent him to war. 92
Despite these arguments, the poll tax remained such a controver-
sial issue that even senators who supported its abolition felt the voting
89. Id. at 6935 (statement of Sen. Pepper). This senator also noted that those
soldiers who had not paid poll taxes previously would be subject to paying the amount
past due, plus interest: "In many cases, it may easily mean with interest and fees, $25,
$30, or $40-a month's pay-to the individual soldier fighting with a democracy, as
part of a democracy, for democracy." Id. The poll tax was not only debated bitterly in
the Senate. See, e.g., id. at 7065-77 (transcripts of the debate in the House of
Representatives).
90. Some states required the poll tax to be paid six, or even nine, months in advance
of an election. See Ronnie L. Podolefsky, The Illusion of Suffrage: Female Voting
Rights and the Women's Poll Tax Repeal Movement After the Nineteenth Amendment,
7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 185, 189, 193 (1998).
91. Senator Claude Pepper noted that "[e]very one of the eight States having a poll
tax makes it a condition precedent to the right to vote," and that soldiers would have
to be "thoughtful enough to have paid it at the time prescribed by the State statutes."
88 CONG. REC. 6935 (1942). He doubted that this was possible under the circum-
stances of military service. See id.
92. Id. It was unlikely that an American overseas, busy fighting a war, would be
sufficiently vigilant about his voting rights to remember to remit his poll tax payment
in a timely manner. See id. (statement of Sen. Pepper). Another difficulty in the timely
payment of the poll tax-one that was not discussed during congressional debates-
was the lack of control servicemen exerted over their mail service. Even those consci-
entious enough to mail a poll tax payment within the period prescribed by their states
were at the mercy of the notoriously slow overseas mail service to get their poll tax
payments in on time. See, e.g., 90 CONG. Ric. 623 (1944) (discussing slow mail
service).
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bill should not be the vehicle to declare its application during war
time.93 They feared the anti-poll tax provision, alone, could prevent
the absentee voting legislation from being passed.
E. Passage of the Act and Its Aftermath
With the election less than two months away, Congress finally
put the bill to a vote. Despite the fierce opposition to certain provi-
sions, on September 16, 1942, the 1942 Soldier Voting Act was en-
acted into law. 9 4 It allowed men and women serving the nation during
wartime to cast absentee ballots so long as they continued to reside
within the United States. 95 As for registration, the Act specifically
stated that, "notwithstanding any provision of State law relating to the
registration of qualified voters," every person absent from their homes
due to their war service was entitled to vote.96 As for the poll tax, the
Act provided that "[n]o person in military service in time of war shall
be required, as a condition of voting in any election for [a federal
office], to pay any poll tax or other tax or make any other payment to
any State or political subdivision thereof." 97 The passage of the latter
measure was rather extraordinary, as it signified the "first expansion
of African American voting rights since Reconstruction [in the
1860s]."98 While there were many lost opportunities to make strides
toward racial equality during World War II-for example, when the
War and Navy Departments were pressured to integrate their units and
ships, they resisted and maintained that racial integration would
"'have a highly destructive effect on morale' "-the elimination of the
poll tax in the soldier voting bill was one shining example of a step
toward equality. 99
Although the elimination of the poll tax for those in the services
was a boon, the overall impact of the law was nonetheless negligible.
Of the four million servicemen and tens of thousands of women serv-
ing the nation, only twenty-eight thousand absentee war ballots were
93. 88 CONG. Ric. 6930 (1942) (statement of Sen. Green). As one senator re-
marked, "[slome members of the committee favor the abolition of the poll tax, but not
by this bill," as the "addition of controversial matter to the pending bill would proba-
bly result in its defeat." Id.
94. Soldier Voting Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-712, 56 Stat. 753 (amended 1944).
95. Id. § 3.
96. Id. § 1.
97. Id.
98. Robert P. Saldin, Strange Bedfellows: War and Minority Rights, 173 WORILD
AFi.i. 57 (2011).
99. BLACK, supra note 31, at 584-85; see also Saldin, supra note 98, at 59 (noting
that more than one million African Americans served in segregated units in the armed
forces during World War 11).
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cast in the 1942 election.'0 In other words, the voter turnout for the
armed services was less than 1%. While the 1942 election generated
one of the lowest voter turnouts in American history, the soldier vote
fell far below the 35.7% national turnout that year.' 0 The Soldier
Voting Act had undoubtedly failed. Due to its late enactment, states
had little time to prepare war ballots and make preparations to execute
their duties under the new law.1 02 With a presidential election two
years away, and millions more Americans joining the services and
shipping out overseas, the Soldier Voting Act needed to be overhauled
in order to be effective in the upcoming presidential election.
II.
THE 1944 VOTING ACT
A. The Need for the Soldier Vote
By 1944, approximately eleven-and-a-half million Americans
were serving in the Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. 03 Added
to this number were hundreds of thousands of women who had left
their homes to serve in the Red Cross, United Service Organizations,
and the Army or Navy Nurse Corps, or noncombatant positions in the
Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps.'0 Thus, approximately
100. Trussell, supra note 18. Interestingly, only one-third of those in the armed ser-
vices who applied for a war ballot cast a vote that was counted. See 90 CONG. REC.
487 (1944) (stating that, of the "4,000,000 persons in our armed forces ... only
78,589 applications were received and . . . only 28,051 votes were cast").
101. Phil Gailey, Voter Turnout Is Estimated at 37.3%, Lowest Since 1942, N.Y.
Timiis, Nov. 8, 1986, at A8 (attributing the low voter turnout to the war and disen-
franchisement of African American voters in the South). As a point of comparison,
the lowest voter turnout was recorded in 1926, with 35.2% of eligible Americans
casting a vote. Id.; see also Editorial, The Worst Voter Turnout in 72 Years, N.Y.
TIMEs (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/opinion/the-worst-voter-
turnout-in-72-years.html (noting that the 2014 voter turnout was the lowest in any
federal election since 1942).
102. See 90 CONG. REc. 607 (1944) (discussing state absentee-voting legislation that
required ballots be returned to the states within twelve to twenty days of the soldier's
receipt). Legislators in the 1944 debates cited the 1942 Act's late enactment as one
contributing factor for the low soldier turnout in the 1942 election. Id. at 620; see also
infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
103. By the Numbers: The US Military, supra note 18; see also News from Home,
YANK MAG., Sept. 10, 1944, at 15 (stating that the "latest figures, released last week,
show that the total strength of the armed forces now comes to about 11,417,000").
104. See generally YEL IN, supra note 43. According to Yellin, approximately
eighty-six thousand women joined the Navy's Women Accepted for Volunteer Emer-
gency Service ("WAVES"). Id. at 137. Nearly twenty thousand women joined the
Marines. Id. at 148. More than eighteen hundred were accepted into training in the
Army Air Force as WASPs. Id. at 154. Approximately eleven thousand women joined
the Coast Guard. Id. at 142. Thirty-five thousand women served as nurses in the Army
and Navy Id. at 168. Seven thousand women worked for the Red Cross overseas. Id.
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twelve million Americans were displaced from their homes to serve
the nation. 05 By one conservative estimate, this meant that one out of
every ten voters was away from home.'0 With Franklin Delano
Roosevelt seeking a controversial fourth term, and the world engulfed
in the fifth year of World War II, the New York Times declared that
the upcoming presidential election was poised to generate "the great-
est absentee vote in the history of the country"-that is, unless suita-
ble legislation was passed.' 07 All eyes turned to Congress to get it
right this time around.
Politically, the nation was divided. Franklin Delano Roosevelt
had already achieved an unprecedented third term as President of the
United States, and Republicans felt no small amount of angst at the
prospect of Roosevelt, a Democrat, winning a fourth term. 08 As early
as December 1943, predictions were made that Roosevelt would win
by a landslide.' 09 Joining the Republicans in resisting a fourth term
were Democrats who opposed the New Deal and Roosevelt's other
social and political reforms. Six southern states traditionally regarded
as blue states-Texas, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, South Caro-
lina, and Florida-were dubbed the "bolting bloc," united by their
common opposition to Roosevelt's liberal policies.o10 The bolting bloc
supported a Democratic platform that opposed "social equality among
the races," promised there would be no federal action to abolish the
poll tax, and reaffirmed the sovereignty of the states." While Repub-
licans and Democrats could agree on foreign policy-the war must be
fought and won-they diverged on domestic issues such as the proper
scope of federal regulations (including legislation of the New Deal
The National World War II Museum estimates that a total of three hundred fifty thou-
sand women served in the armed forces or volunteered for war organizations at home
and abroad. See American Women in World War II: On the Home Front and Beyond,
NAT'L WWII MUSEUM, http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-stu-
dents/ww2-history/at-a-glance/women-in-ww2.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
105. Throughout congressional debates, many senators and representatives reported
that there were eleven million Americans in the services. See, e.g., 90 CONG. Ri-c. 614
(1944). But, considering that there were nearly eleven-and-a-half million men in the
armed forces as of September 1944, see News from Home, supra note 103, at 15, and
there were hundreds of thousands of women who were also serving the nation in one
capacity or another, see supra note 104 and accompanying text, it is more accurate to
state that there were nearly twelve million Americans in the services.
106. 90 CONG. Risc. 487 (1944) (statement of Rep. Lesinski).
107. Trussell, supra note 18.
108. See Insulating Servicemen, CHI. SUN, June 23, 1944.
109. See, e.g., Hague Predicts Fourth Term, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1944, at 6.
110. Turner Catledge, Southern Bolters Map 4th Term Fight, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9,
1944, at 28 (reporting on the formation of the "bolting bloc").
Ill. See id. (discussing the conditions bolting bloc delegates were instructed to insist
upon at the national convention).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
2016]1 355
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
ilk)."l 2 With southern, traditionally Democratic, states refusing to sup-
port Roosevelt, it seemed the 1944 election would be a close call. The
soldier vote, alone, could easily determine the outcome of the election.
After all, Roosevelt had won his third term by a margin of approxi-
mately five million votes.' 1 3
Over the winter of 1943, Congress debated a comprehensive
amendment to the 1942 soldier voting law. Initially, a proposal was
made (known as the Lucas-Green measure), to create a Federal War
Ballot Commission in order to streamline overseas voting and avoid
the hassle of allowing each state to dictate how its citizens in the ser-
vices could vote.1 14 Impassioned speeches about the proposed Com-
mission's unconstitutionality swayed many votes. In the words of
Mississippi Representative John Rankin, the proposed bill "violates
the laws of practically all the States and the constitutions of most of
them."' '5 Rankin especially disfavored the bill, arguing it allowed ab-
sentee voters to cast a vote for several offices by merely designating
whether he or she was voting "Republican" or "Democrat."I16
"[U]nder our state laws," he said, "we do not even print a party name
on the ballot; you have to go down the ballot and pick out the candi-
dates; and if you have not enough intelligence or have not paid enough
attention to the election to know who those candidates are, that is your
misfortune."" Rankin argued that many states would not know "what
to do with a ballot" if a soldier wrote "Republican" or "Democrat"
instead of identifying a candidate by name." 8 One representative re-
ferred to this proposed ballot as a mere "gesture of a ballot," one that
would not result in more soldiers casting votes, because the ballots
cast could not be counted if the states did not know how to interpret
them." 9 This potent coalition "killed the bill," and the onus to provide
112. See Robert A. Taft, Taft Says the Big Issue Is the Domestic Problem of Restor-
ing Liberties, N.Y. TIMiS MAG., Sept. 3, 1944, at 12, 37-38 (comparing the party
platforms).
113. BLACK, supra note 31, at 598.
114. 90 CONG. REc. 600-28 (1944) (presenting the Lucas-Green proposal); id. at
612 (referring to the proposal as "the Lucas-Green bill").
115. 89 CONG. REC. 9632 (1943).
116. Id.
117. Id. Rankin did not seem to consider that many Americans might vote a party
line, nor did he consider the difficulty Americans overseas might have in staying
abreast of the candidates running for local, state, and federal offices. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (statement of Rep. Vursell). Representative Charles Vursell maintained that
such a ballot would be "a great disappointment to a great many of the men who would
receive it" because it would "not have the name of a single candidate on it, not even
for President of the United States or for Member of Congress." Id.
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a method for absentee voting once again fell on each individual
state.120
Public opinion fiercely opposed this outcome. From the popular
soldier newspaper The Stars and Stripes to home front publications,
the overwhelming sentiment was that federal legislation was needed
for the armed forces to have a fair chance to cast a ballot.121 Even
President Roosevelt felt he could no longer refrain from speaking on
this important issue. In a January 1944 message to Congress, the Pres-
ident declared: "The American people are very much concerned over
the fact that the vast majority of the 11,000,000 members of the armed
forces . . . are going to be deprived of their right to vote in the impor-
tant national election this fall, unless the Congress promptly enacts
adequate legislation."l 2 2 Voicing support for the bill that was defeated
in 1943, Roosevelt praised the measure's efficiency and simplicity.
The bill would have provided "blank ballots on special paper suitable
for air delivery . . . by the War and Navy Departments to all the fronts
and camps and stations out in the field well in advance of election
day." 23 Once the names of all candidates were known, lists of their
names would be distributed, and the soldiers could then vote for their
choice of candidates in secrecy.' 24 If the men did not receive a list of
candidates, they could still vote by naming the party for which he or
she wished to vote.1 25 "Our millions of fighting men do not have any
lobby or pressure group on Capitol Hill to see that justice is done for
them," Roosevelt observed.1 26 But, as "their Commander in Chief, I
am sure that I can express their wishes in this matter and their resent-
120. The Nation: Votes for Soldiers, Timio, Jan. 17, 1944, at 1.
121. Excerpts from Stars and Stripes were read into the Congressional Record, reaf-
firming that the Americans at war were eager to cast ballots in the 1944 election and
were counting on Congress to provide a mechanism to make it possible. 90 CONG.
Riic. 20-21 (1944). "We on the front are determined to use bullets and ballots," de-
clared the Algiers edition of Stars and Stripes. Id. at 21. Congress was well aware of
the criticism it faced over the defeat of the Lucas-Green voting bill. Id. at 432-33
(noting that "commentators, columnists, and newsmen alike . . . say or infer Congress
does not want the soldier to vote; that we are trying by circumlocution and subterfuge
to keep him from having his ballot").
122. Id. at 706. Roosevelt admitted that he had "hesitated to say anything to Con-
gress on this matter for the simple reason that the making of these rules is solely
within the discretion of the two Houses of the legislative branch of the Government."
See id. at 708. Be that as it may, Roosevelt believed "most Americans will agree with
me that every Member of the two Houses of Congress ought to be willing in justice
'to stand up and be counted.'" Id.
123. Id. at 707.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 708.
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ment against the discrimination which is being practiced against
them."1 2 7 Congress had its marching orders.
B. Designing the Absentee Ballot
In early 1944, a new bill was proposed. It provided that the fed-
eral government would make recommendations to the states in an ef-
fort to create a uniform voting process for all persons displaced by
virtue of their involvement in fighting the war or by serving those who
were.1 2 8 Early congressional hearings attempted to pinpoint how the
1942 bill had failed and how it could be improved. Congress deter-
mined that one of the chief problems with the 1942 legislation was its
late passage.1 2 9 As the bill was signed into law only one-and-a-half
months before Election Day, there was inadequate time for the states
to comply with the bill's three-part process (receipt of a serviceman's
ballot request, the state's mailing of a ballot, and the serviceman's
transmission of the completed ballot) before Election Day.'3 0 The
1942 bill also provided no mechanism for overseas voting; thus, all
Americans serving overseas were automatically disenfranchised based
on their location.1 3 ' Congress was under pressure to ensure that the
1944 bill being drafted and debated would not suffer from such
defects.
The proposed bill strove to make absentee voting "as simple as
possible."1 3 2 Although many legislators wished to provide a ballot that
covered local, state, and federal elections (rather than just federal elec-
tions), the magnitude of the task rendered it impractical. For example,
as Senator Lucas explained of his own state: there were "102 counties
in Illinois. We have 102 different kinds of tickets in Illinois. If the
Army and Navy are going to carry State ballots ... they will have to
carry 102 Illinois ballots to every camp in this country and every camp
overseas." 3 3 In addition, no one knew "where the 700,000 or 800,000
[Illinois] boys are serving," as the Secretaries of War and the Navy
refused to provide the names, serial numbers, or addresses of service-
127. Id.
128. Id. at 600-03 (reading the text of the proposed amendment).
129. See, e.g., id. at 487-88; id. at 620 (discussing the "shortage of time" following
the enactment of 1942 absentee voter legislation as a reason for the low soldier voter
turnout in that election).
130. Id.; see also id. at 607 (discussing state legislation requiring ballots be returned
to the states within twelve to twenty days). See generally 88 CONG. Ri-c. 6547 (1942)
(discussing the general workings of the 1942 bill).
131. See Soldier Voting Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-712, 56 Stat. 753 (amended
1944).
132. 90 CONG. Rac. 621 (1944) (statement of Sen. Theodore Green).
133. Id. at 611.
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men because releasing such information threatened the soldiers' secur-
ity.134 Furthermore, servicemens' addresses were constantly
changing.' 35 The War and Navy Departments simply could not bear
the burden of hosting each state and local election. According to the
Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce, in 1942, there were
elections held on ninety-nine different dates for federal, state, county,
and municipal offices.1 36 Put differently, there was an election one out
of every four days.' 3 7 As eager as the War and Navy Departments
were to allow their men to vote, the feat of transporting the necessary
ballots to certain state citizens around the world and ensuring that the
ballots were returned in time to be counted was unachievable. Thus,
Congress narrowed its vision to creating a wartime absentee ballot for
only federal offices in the 1944 election.13 8
A foremost consideration was designing federal ballots so that
their shipment would pose the least hardship to the already
overburdened Army and Navy. First, there were concerns about allot-
ting adequate shipping space and time to mail ballots around the
world.1 39 The average state ballot, including an envelope and voting
instructions, weighed three ounces; its size and weight was the
equivalent of approximately one thousand microfilmed V-mail let-
ters.' 4 0 Congress feared that if ballots were to displace letters from
family, it would be destructive to soldiers' morale.1 4 1 Exacerbating
this potential problem were the inefficient multiple-mailings required
under many state election laws. The War Department informed Con-
134. Id.; see, e.g., G. AULEN REEDER, LETTER WRITING IN WARTIME, "How AND
WHAT TO WRITE AnouT," 197-201 (1943) (discussing restrictions on mail to those
serving in the Army and Navy and information that must not be mentioned in letters
or on envelopes, such as the name of a ship or an address other than that "officially
designated by the military or Naval authorities").
135. It was estimated that the "changes of address ... of the soldiers each day are in
excess of 10,000 that are in this country and abroad." 90 CONG. Risc. 607 (1944)
(statement of Sen. Lucas).
136. Id. at 610.
137. Id.
138. Id. (proposing a uniform federal ballot).
139. Id. at 730.
140. Id. (quoting a January 11, 1944 letter from the War Department to Congress,
which was read before the Committee on Privileges and Elections on January 20, and
re-read during the Senate debate on January 26, 1944). The Army and Navy were so
overburdened with mail that they began microfilming V-mail to reduce the amount of
shipping space needed. See 88 CONG. REc. 7058 (1942).
141. 90 CONG. Rizc. 785 (1944) (statement of Sen. Murdock) (stating that "there is
nothing more conducive to the maintenance of that morale on the battle fronts and the
morale at home than an interchange of letters between soldiers and sailors and their
parents, relatives, and sweethearts"). Sending each person in the services their state's
ballot would have displaced billions of V-mail letters. See id.
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gress that approximately a dozen states had adopted voting procedures
that "'entail[ed] a minimum of four air carriages, apart from the trans-
mission of the initial post card.' "142 Even those states that required a
ballot request by post card, the mailing of the ballot, and the return of
the ballot-three carriages-posed a difficulty. The War Department
called on Congress to ensure that its legislation for the 1944 election
provided for a single, lightweight ballot and minimal use of the al-
ready overtaxed mails. 14 3
A second consideration was the need to ship ballots well in ad-
vance of the election so that the Army and Navy had sufficient time to
transport them across Europe, North Africa, the Mediterranean, and
remote islands dotted across the Pacific Ocean."'" Mail could be noto-
riously slow.1 4 5 By one senator's numbers, the average time for a bal-
lot to make the round trip by mail ranged from twenty-two days to
North Africa, to fifty-two days to the Far East. 146 Another considera-
tion was the fact that ten thousand Americans in the services were
142. Id. at 730 (quoting a January 11, 1944 War Department letter read before the
Committee on Privileges and Elections on January 20, and re-read before the Senate
on January 26, 1944); see also supra note 140.
143. Id. It is likely that the War Department was concerned that a multi-step absen-
tee ballot process would strain resources necessary to ship essential war supplies (such
as tanks, airplanes, anti-aircraft guns, ammunition, etc.) to Europe, especially for the
upcoming invasion of Normandy. See, e.g., id. at 610 (stating that the Secretaries of
War and Navy would take all steps necessary to deliver ballots, so long as they did not
"interfere with the effective prosecution of the war"). No definite date for the invasion
could be set, as it depended on the weather, tide, and completion of preparations.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, CRUSADE IN EUROPE 239 (1948). Meanwhile, war raged in
the Pacific and supplies also needed to be shipped halfway around the world to remote
islands stretching from just north of Australia to the shores of Japan. When the mail
service was already strained by pressing needs for war supplies, the addition of eleven
million post cards, eleven million ballots, and another eleven million (completed) bal-
lots-under the more efficient state legislation-seemed impossible. For these rea-
sons, the War and Navy Departments urged Congress to develop a federal ballot that
would be lightweight and that required as few mailings as possible.
144. 90 CONG. REc. 623 (1944) (statement of Sen. Revercomb).
145. One senator recalled an "amusing story" about how slow the delivery of mail
could be. Id. at 615. The story had been reported by renowned war correspondent
Ernie Pyle. ERNmuE Pyu, HERE IS YOUR WAR 49 (1943). Pyle, who was stationed in
North Africa, heard a story of one soldier who had not received a single letter from his
wife in three months and became so disgusted that he finally wrote her a letter threat-
ening divorce. Id. The following day, he received a bundle of fifty letters that covered
the three-month period he had gone without mail. Id. He had to telegram his wife to
take back the divorce threats. Id.
146. 90 CONG. REC. 623 (1944) ("1 find that to transport a ballot by air mail both
ways from a central point in the United States, say Springfield, Ill., to various points
where our soldiers and sailors may be, requires the following times: To [N]orth Af-
rica, 22 days; to Europe, 37 days; to the Pacific, 43 days; and to the Far East, 52
days."). The numbers quoted above may be conservative estimates, for during a de-
bate two days later, the following chart was considered for purposes of discussion:
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moved to new locations each day. 14 7 Thus, if it was possible to create
a method of voting that did not require a particular ballot to reach a
particular person, the burden on the Army and Navy would be greatly
reduced. This factor weighed heavily in favor of a universal federal
ballot, one that could be used by any person in the services-regard-
less of his or her home state.1 48
A final goal was to create a ballot that could be shipped around
the world well in advance of the November election. As the Demo-
cratic National Convention came after the Republican National Con-
vention, and the former was scheduled for July, ballots bearing the
names of the candidates could not be printed until July. 149 Some mem-
bers of Congress had serious doubts that the Army and Navy would










(e) South Atlantic area:
Nearest 10
Farthest 12
(f) Middle East area:
Nearest 14
Farthest 16
(g) Persian Gulf area: 18




Nearest long haul 18
Nearest short haul 13 /2
Farthest long haul 22
Farthest short haul 17 /2
(j) North Atlantic area:
Nearest 9 '/2
Farthest 29 1/2
See id. at 716 (quoting the figures in this chart).
147. Id. at 611 (statement of Sen. Lucas).
148. Id. at 610 (discussing the impossibility of the Army and Navy following the
distinct voting laws of each state and the need for a single law creating a ballot requir-
ing a single air carriage so ballots could be mailed in bulk).
149. See id. at 722 (discussing the scheduling of the Democratic Convention).
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have sufficient time to distribute ballots and transport them back to the
United States to be counted within this timeframe.150
Due to these factors, the proposed federal war ballot took on a
different appearance than a home-front ballot. To avoid printing bal-
lots at the last minute after the Democratic National Convention, the
bill envisioned the use of a bobtailed ballot-a ballot that listed the
offices at issue in the election (examples include President, Vice-Pres-
ident, Senator, etc.), and allowed the voter to write the name of the
candidate for whom he or she was voting. 5 1 Under the bill, this ballot
would have the following format 52:
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OFFICIAL FEDERAL WAR BALLOT
Instruction-To vote, write in the name of the candidate of
your choice for each office.
ELECTORS OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
(A vote for President includes a vote for Vice President of the same party, and shall be
deemed to be a vote for the candidates by name for Presidential and Vice Presidential
electors of his party in your State)
Write in the name of your choice for President.
UNITED STATES SENATOR
(ONLY if a Senator is to be elected in your State)
Write in the name of your choice for Senator.
UNITED STATES SENATOR
(ONLY if a Senator is to be elected in y
Write in the name of your choice for Senator.
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRE
Write in the name of your choice for
Representative in Congress for your district.
REPRESENTATIVE AT LA
(ONLY in the States e
Write in the name or names of your choice for
Representative at Large.
UNEXPIRED TERM
our State for an unexpired term)
SS FOR YOUR DISTRICT
RGE IN CONGRESS
ntitled thereto)
Vote for one or two
as the case may be
Such a "blank" ballot could be printed well in advance of the
election, could be used by anyone irrespective of their home state, and
gave the Army and Navy ample time to ship the ballots to troops
around the world. To eliminate excessive use of the mails, the new bill
required only two transmissions: one to the soldier and the other back
to the states.' 5 3 In addition, the federal ballot was small, "printed on
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thin paper, weighing very little, uniform in size, could be carried in
bulk, and ... would take up much less space" than the state ballots.1 5 4
These provisions eased the burden on the mails significantly.' 55
C. Tension in the Legislature
The bill was met by stiff opposition. Ohio Senator Robert Taft
emerged as its chief opponent. Fomenting his hostility to the measure
was his deep-seated distrust of the Democratic Party, and, in particu-
lar, President Roosevelt.1 56 Despite all the benefits of a universal fed-
eral ballot, he argued that a ballot should name the candidates. "I have
no doubt that in the State of Maine, for instance, where no Senator is
up for election this year, there will be thousands of votes cast for a
Democrat for Senator in Maine," Taft maintained.' 57 "Is that a reason-
able kind of a ballot?" he asked.' 5 8 Taft openly expressed his doubts
in the abilities of the Secretaries of War and the Navy, officials ap-
pointed by Roosevelt, to conduct a fair election, suggesting that they
would help Roosevelt by strategically hosting elections. "They can
have [an election] held just after a great victory. . . . They can empha-
size the prestige of the President in the election," Taft elaborated.159
Taft ignored that the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, was, like Taft,
a Republican.' 60
One of the bill's chief proponents, Illinois Senator Scott Lucas,
quickly quashed Taft's criticism of the bobtailed ballot.161 Lucas
noted that the Supreme Court had held, in Newberry v. United States,
that Congress could exercise its power to regulate elections by di-
recting "that voting must be by written or printed ballot or voting ma-
chines."' 6 2 Taft was not so foolhardy as to argue against this Supreme
Court precedent.1 6 3
Instead, Taft turned his attention to the bill's elimination of voter
registration and poll tax requirements for the armed services. Al-
though the 1942 bill had suspended state registration and poll tax laws
154. Id. at 619.
155. Id. at 621 (noting that "this bill makes the balloting as simple as possible").
156. See WuLuAM S. WHiE, THE TAFr STORY 43-45 (1954).
157. 90 CONG. RE-c. 712 (1944).
158. Id. It is hard to believe that this argument was based on a genuine fear that a
person would vote for an office that was already filled. It seems obvious that, in such
a situation, a state would simply ignore the mistakenly cast vote.
159. Id. at 717.
160. GOODWIN, supra note 27, at 71 (noting that Stimson was a Republican
conservative).
161. 90 CONG. REC. 720 (1944).
162. Id. (quoting Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 255 (1921)).
163. See id. at 721 (indicating Senator Taft's lack of a response).
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for those in the services, Taft believed these issues were still matters
for debate.'" Once he opened these cans of worms, Taft sat back and
let his colleagues from the South make impassioned speeches about
state sovereignty and the necessity of the poll tax to maintain white
superiority. Louisiana Senator John Overton made some of the boldest
statements on this issue. "In Mississippi and Louisiana, down in the
Solid South," he said to the Senate floor, "we have got to retain our
constitutional rights to prescribe qualifications of electors, and for
what reason? Because we are bound to maintain white supremacy in
those States." 65 When Overton was reminded that the 1942 law had
eliminated registration and the poll tax, and yet "white supremacy"
had been maintained in the South, he responded that the "poison is
slow in its operation, but none the less deadly." 6 6
In the face of these and other arguments that Congress lacked the
power to create a universal federal war ballot that suspended state vot-
ing requirements, supporters of the bill turned to a new argument
favoring the legislation: Congress could act under its war powers.' 67
Case law seemed to be on their side. For instance, in Burroughs v.
United States, the Supreme Court considered, inter alia, whether a fed-
eral law governing corrupt election practices violated the states' power
to appoint electors under Article H, Section I of the Constitution.' 68
The Supreme Court ruled that the importance of a presidential election
"cannot be too strongly stated," and to "say that Congress is without
power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election
from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny the
nation in a vital particular the power of self-protection." 69 The Court
went so far as to state: "Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that power,
164. Id. at 719.
165. Id. at 725. When Overton was asked whether he believed that "this bill would
tend to tear down white supremacy," he answered, "It would." Id. His frustration over
the expansion of the federal government, first with the New Deal programs, and now
with the war, was apparent. Believing the federal government was encroaching on the
power of the states, he delivered several diatribes against the soldier voting bill. Id. In
one such episode, he accused the federal government of saying to the states:
You cannot prescribe the qualifications of the voters .. . we will deny you
the right to require registration; we deny you the right of prescribing edu-
cational tests; we deny the poll-tax provision; we deny this, and we deny
that .... [W]e assume the authority to abolish all those safeguards which
you [the states] have undertaken to [ensure] white control of your local
governments.
Id. "We cannot, we shall not ... submit to such action," Overton declared. Id.
166. Id. at 726-27.
167. See id. at 721.
168. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
169. Id. at 545.
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as it possesses every other power essential to preserve the departments
and institutions of the general government from impairment or de-
struction, whether threatened by force or by corruption."o7 0 Resting on
Burroughs, it was argued that Congress had the power to protect the
1944 election "from the distortion which would be caused by the en-
forced absence of a substantial body of the electorate."' 7 ' By one sen-
ator's estimate, approximately twenty percent of eligible voters had
been "lifted from their homes and scattered to the four corners of the
earth, without their sanction"; they had been taken by the Army and
Navy "because it is war."' 72 Under Burroughs, how could the Consti-
tution's war powers provision not bestow upon Congress the power to
avoid the "destruction" of millions of Americans' voting rights simply
because they were far from home fighting for their country?
Another case supporting Congress's authority to suspend state re-
gistration and poll tax requirements involved emergency legislation to
ameliorate the economic crisis during the Great Depression. "While
emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occa-
sion for the exercise of power," the Supreme Court explained in Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell. 7 3 In the course of its decision,
the Court reasoned that "the war power of the Federal Government is
not created by the emergency of war, but it is a power given to meet
that emergency. It is a power to wage war successfully." 7 4 Relying on
this broad definition of Congress's war powers, Senator Lucas argued
that surely Congress, in times of war, had the authority to pass legisla-
tion that safeguarded the right to vote for those in the services. 7 5 Af-
ter all, "Congress declared war. Congress enacted the Selective
Service Act .... Congress can tell almost anyone in this emergency
just what he may or may not do."' 7 6
As weeks of debate turned into months, tempers and patience
wore thin. The charade of niceties was slowly worn down, and the
issue of soldier voting became a partisan issue, with Republicans and
170. Id. Put in slightly different terms, the Supreme Court concluded that the "power
of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice President from corruption
being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed to
the judgment of Congress." Id. at 547. Whether disenfranchising up to eleven million
Americans in a presidential election amounted to "corruption" is debatable. But the
spirit of the Court's holding certainly weighed in favor of Congress having the power
to provide a mechanism to allow these Americans to vote.
171. 90 CONG. RiEC. 721 (1944) (statement of Sen. Lucas).
172. Id.
173. 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
174. Id.
175. 90 CONG. REc. 720-21 (1944).
176. Id.
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Democrats accusing one another of intentionally manipulating the leg-
islation to ensure a certain outcome in the presidential election.
It began on an apologetic note, when a Democratic Representa-
tive from Illinois broached the subject. "I hate to say it; I do not want
to hurt anybody's feelings," he began, "but I cannot help but believe
that the Republicans, fearing that most of these servicemen, by right,
would cast their votes for President Roosevelt . . . will vote for the
[Soldier Voting Bill] because they feel that . .. many of those service-
men and servicewomen will be deprived of the right to vote." 7 7 A
Republican representative then countered that the Democrats were re-
sponsible for the creation of a bobtailed ballot for service people, and
had chosen not to provide them with the same sort of ballot that the
public on the home front would use. 7 8 Republicans emphasized how
the bobtailed ballot would make it difficult to vote.' 7 9 They reminded
their fellow legislators that while Americans might be able to name
the candidates for President, they were less likely to recall the names
of the senators and representatives running for office in their home
states.' 80 Republicans also believed that the bobtailed ballot clearly
favored Roosevelt, and charged Democrats with manipulating the bal-
lot so he could win a fourth term.' 8 ' As Republican Senator Styles
Bridges explained, his son was fighting in the Pacific theater and
would have to cast an absentee ballot. The "only President whom that
boy can remember-and he has been in overseas service for nearly a
year and in active service nearly 2 years-is the present President of
the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt."' 8 2 If his son was like the
other millions of Americans fighting overseas, when "given a blank
ballot to vote and the present incumbent is the only President he has
heard of in the last 11 years, and the name of the other candidate is not
available to him, how can he intelligently cast his vote?"' 83 While the
177. Id. at 2621.
178. See id. at 2622.
179. Id. at 722.
180. Id.
181. Id. Adding to the Republicans' concern that the bobtailed ballot would favor
Roosevelt were military opinion polls that showed the armed services favored
Roosevelt. See, e.g., What They Think, TIME, Feb. 7, 1944, at 72 (reporting that a poll
conducted in the Southwest Pacific of more than "700 enlisted men: soldier, sailors,
marines; whites and Negroes" revealed that 69.2% were in favor of a fourth term for
Roosevelt).
182. 90 CONG. Ric. 722 (2014).
183. Id. The bobtailed ballot was ostensibly offered to ensure that ballots could be
shipped around the world, well in advance of the election, so that the Army and Navy
would have plenty of time to distribute the ballots to every American. If the names of
the candidates were provided on the ballots, the ballots could not be printed and
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answer was relatively easy-all his son and others like him would
have to do is write the word "Republican" or "Democrat" in the space
provided-the use of a bobtailed ballot remained a sticking point for
many Republicans.
The legislators' sense of decorum continued to diminish. "I am
sick and tired of individuals charging indirectly and with innuendo
that somebody is trying to do something about the fourth term," one
exasperated senator remarked.' 8 4 "Let Senators on the other side keep
on fooling around with this bill in the way they are doing, and I will
guarantee that Mr. Roosevelt will be reelected for a fourth term," he
predicted.' 85 In the House, Democratic Representative Michael Brad-
ley admonished his "good friends on the Republican side" that "when
these soldiers come back they are going to be resentful of those who
have made it difficult for them to cast their ballots." 8 6 Disgusted by
the delay, proposed amendments to reinstate the state poll tax and re-
gistration requirements, and other tactics to slow passage of the bill,
Representative Bradley asked his colleagues to not kid themselves
about the purpose of this political handiwork. He concluded his re-
marks by stating: "It is a bill to make it difficult for soldiers to
vote."1 8 7
D. Passage and Aftermath
Despite the months of bickering over the bill, it finally passed
and became law in April 1944.188 Although he did not veto the Act,
President Roosevelt criticized it as "'wholly inadequate' and 'confus-
ing.'" 8 9 In the end, a federal ballot was created that would allow
those in the services to vote only if their state did not have an adequate
voting mechanism.1 90 Through the following recommendations, the
bill encouraged the states to take action and amend their absentee vot-
ing laws. The law urged states to allow members of the armed forces
to request an absentee state ballot by use of a postcard printed by the
federal government that would be distributed to every person in the
shipped until after the July Democratic National Convention. See supra notes 154-58
and accompanying text.
184. 90 CONG. REC. 613 (1944) (statement of Sen. Lucas).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2623.
187. Id.
188. See Act of Apr. 1, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-277, 58 Stat. 136.
189. William M. Leary, Jr., Books, Soldiers and Censorship During the Second
World War, 20 AM. Q. 237, 240 (1968).
190. Act of Apr. 1, 1944 §§ 202-203.
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services.191 On their postcard, each prospective voter would fill out
basic pedigree information and return the postcard to the secretary of
state of their state of residence.1 92 If state law permitted, the postcard
operated as a request for a state ballot, and it was recommended that
the secretaries of state transmit a state ballot expeditiously upon re-
ceipt of the postcard.1 93 The federal bill recommended that states ex-
tend the timeline under their absentee ballot laws to account for the
mailing of ballots to and from remote locations, waive registration re-
quirements, and reduce the size and weight of their ballots and other
voting materials. 194
In the event that a state governor certified that his state did not
have an adequate absentee ballot procedure, or that a federal ballot
would be accepted, the bill also established an "Official Federal War
Ballot."' 95 Twenty states authorized the use of this federal ballot.1 96
Although assurances had been made throughout congressional hear-
ings that the federal bobtailed ballot would not require voters to iden-
tify candidates by name (and that voters could instead designate the
political party they supported for a particular office), the Official Fed-
eral War Ballot instructed its users: "To vote, write in the name of the
candidate of your choice for each office."l 9 7 However, the bill pro-
vided that no ballot would be invalid if there was a "mistake or omis-
sion in writing the name of the candidate where the candidate intended
by the voter is plainly identifiable."' 9 8 In addition, each state was re-
quired to provide "a list of candidates and their parties" to the United
States War Ballot Commission, which would in turn be provided to
the Secretaries of War and the Navy for distribution abroad.1 99 For the
twenty states that permitted the use of the federal ballot, the names
191. Id.
192. Id. § 203.
193. Id. § 207(b).
194. Id. § 207(d)-(e).
195. Id. §§ 302-303.
196. The states that authorized the use of the federal ballot were: California, Con-
necticut, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. See Candidates for the Fed-
eral Ballot, YANK MAG., Oct. 15, 1944, at 22-23. The remaining twenty-eight states
required their citizens to vote through a state absentee ballot. Id.
197. § 303(a).
198. Id. It seems this language would have permitted a person to write "Republican"
or "Democrat" rather than a candidate's name, and still have their vote counted. The
congressional debates on the use of the bobtailed ballot would certainly lend support
to this interpretation. See, e.g., 90 CONG. Risc. 722 (1944) (statement of Sen. Bridges)
("All he would have to do would be to write in the word 'Republican."').
199. § 306.
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and offices of candidates running for election were also printed in
Yank, the Army Weekly, a pervasive and beloved Army publication. 200
One of the most striking omissions from the 1944 Act was that,
unlike its 1942 counterpart, it made no provision concerning the sus-
pension of the poll tax. In fact, its language that the Federal War Bal-
lot Commission "shall have no powers or functions with respect to the
determination of the validity of ballots cast under the provisions of
this title," and that "such determination shall be made by the duly
constituted election officials of the appropriate districts, precincts,
counties, or other voting units of the several States," enabled states to
exclude the ballots of those in the armed services who were unable to
register to vote (in person) and had not paid their poll taxes. 201 In
these ways, the 1944 bill was a step backward from the bill passed in
1942.
In November 1944, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected to a
fourth term; approximately three million votes separated him from the
Republican candidate, Thomas E. Dewey. 202 Once again, the average
voter turnout on the home front was considerably higher than the sol-
dier vote. On average, 55.9% of eligible Americans cast a vote, while
only about 25% of those in the armed services cast an absentee bal-
lot.2 0 3 An estimated 3.4 million absentee ballots were cast in 1944,
which was an improvement over the 28,000 cast in 1942.20 However,
that almost seventy-five percent of Americans in uniform did not vote
suggests the 1944 bill also failed to provide a meaningful opportunity
to vote.
One problem that plagued the 1944 election was the delay in mail
service. For example, in a September 1944 issue of Yank, the Army
Weekly, one soldier stationed in France griped in a letter to the editor
that he received his ballot for the Michigan primary election after the
election already occurred. 205 He had read that absentee ballots were to
be given "high priority" and delivered by airmail. "Does 'High Prior-
200. Candidates for the Federal Ballot, supra note 196, at 22-23.
201. § 311(a).
202. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, YANK MAG., Apr. 27, 1945, at 10.
203. See Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections: 1828-2008, AM. PRESIDENCY PRO-
J.iCT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.eduldata/turnout.php (last visited Mar. 4, 2016); see
also About the Election, YANK MAG., Nov. 19, 1944, at 3.
204. About the Election, supra note 203 (providing that an estimated 3.4 million
absentee ballots were cast by Americans displaced from their homes due to the war);
Trussell, supra note 18, at E9.
205. Too Late to Vote, YANK MAG., Sept. 3, 1944, at 20.
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ity' mean in excess of 40 days?" he asked. 206 As a pre-election poll of
servicemen revealed that "100% felt strongly about their right to vote"
and did not want to rely on the complicated mechanisms set up by the
states, the results of the 1944 election indicate that absentee voter leg-
islation was ineffective-at both the state and federal levels. 2 0 7 One of
the most tragic ironies of the war was that the majority of men risking
their lives fighting for their nation were deprived of an opportunity to
have a voice in the 1944 presidential election.
III.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1942 AND 1944 SOLDIER
VOTING LEGISLATION
A. The End of the Poll Tax And Other Mechanisms of Voting
Discrimination
One of the obstacles that plagued the soldier voting bills was the
insistence by some state representatives on maintaining "white superi-
ority" by depriving African Americans, including those in the ser-
vices, of their right to vote. 2 0 8 Toward the tail-end of the war and
afterwards, inroads were made to tear down the artifices that limited
the voting rights promised by the Fifteenth Amendment.
Beginning with the Supreme Court's 1944 decision in Smith v.
Allwright, race-based hindrances to voting rights began to be disman-
tled.2 0 In Smith, an African American man living in Texas was de-
nied the right to cast a ballot in a primary election in 1940 for the
nomination of Democratic congressional candidates as well as certain
state officers.210 He brought suit, and his complaint was dismissed in
district court.2 11 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, citing the Supreme
Court's decision in Grovey v. Townsend, affirmed because Grovey
held that the denial of an absentee ballot to an African American resi-
dent-solely because of his race-in a primary election did not violate
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. 2 12
206. Id.; see also 90 CONG. Ri-c. 623 (1944) (discussing the slow speed of the mail
service from the United States to various overseas locations where soldiers and sailors
were stationed).
207. The Nation: Votes for Soldiers, supra note 120, at 2 (referencing a poll con-
ducted by the Algiers edition of Stars and Stripes, the Army's overseas newspaper).
208. See, e.g., 90 CONG. REc. 725 (1944) (statement of Sen. Overton).
209. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
210. Id. at 651.
211. Id. at 650.
212. Smith v. Allwright, 131 F.2d 593, 594 (5th Cir. 1942) (per curiam), rev'd, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); see also Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). In Grovey, the
Supreme Court found that the "managers of the primary election [could not be charac-
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In spite of Grovey, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts
in Smith based on its intervening decision in United States v. Classic,
which held that Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution authorized
Congress to regulate both primary and general elections. 2 13 Relying on
Classic, the Supreme Court held that "the right to vote in such a pri-
mary for the nomination of candidates without discrimination by the
State, like the right to vote in a general election, is a right secured by
the Constitution." 2 14 As the Fifteenth Amendment provided that the
right to vote could not be abridged by any state on account of race, the
Court held that "the great privilege of the ballot may not be denied a
man by the State because of his color." 2 15
It was no secret that the poll tax operated to deny the ballot to
African American voters, and essentially accomplished what the Su-
preme Court held to be unconstitutional in Smith. But, the battle to
eradicate the poll tax was not won until almost two decades after the
Smith decision. 2 16 First, in 1962, Congress proposed the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which provided:
The right of the citizens of the United States to vote in any
primary or other election for President or Vice President, for elec-
tors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representa-
tive in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or any State by reason of failure to pay a poll tax or other
tax.2 17
Two years later, the amendment was ratified. 218 Even the ex-
traordinary act of passing a constitutional amendment did not put an
end to the issue, for the payment of a poll tax could still be required to
terized] as state officers in such sense that any action taken by them in obedience to
the mandate of the state convention respecting eligibility to participate in the organi-
zation's deliberations, is state action." Id. at 53. For this, among other reasons, the
Supreme Court concluded that it could find "no ground for holding that the respon-
dent [county clerk] has in obedience to the mandate of the law of Texas discriminated
against the petitioner or denied him any right guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments." Id. at 55.
213. Smith, 321 U.S. at 659-60 (1944) (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 316-17 (1941)).
214. Id. at 661-62. The Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]he statutes of Texas
relating to primaries and the resolution of the Democratic party of Texas extending
the privileges of membership to white citizens only are the same in substance and
effect today as they were when Grovey v. Townsend was decided by a unanimous
Court." Id. at 661.
215. Id. at 662 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XV).
216. See U.S. CONST. amend XXIV.
217. Id.; see also 24th Amendment to States, N.Y. Timins, Sept. 15, 1962, at 15.
218. 24th Amendment, Banning Poll Tax, Has Been Ratified, N.Y. Timi;s, Jan. 24,
1964, at 1.
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cast a ballot in a state election. 219 However, two years after the ratifi-
cation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, in 1966, the Supreme Court
held, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, that "[tlo introduce
wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is
to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor," and that to require pay-
ment of a poll tax as a "condition of obtaining a ballot" caused "an
'invidious' discrimination . . . that runs afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause." 220 The precedent that had existed at the time of the 1942 and
1944 soldier voting bills-established by Breedlove-was overruled
by Harper to the extent it allowed a poll tax to serve as a prerequisite
to voting.221
B. A New Voting Age
As the poll tax was put to rest, America became embroiled in war
once again, but this time with Vietnam. In 1968, President Lyndon B.
Johnson sent a message to Congress, asking it to lower the voting age
to eighteen. "The ballot box is the great anvil of democracy, where
democracy is shaped by the will of the people," his message began.222
He noted that "[a]t the age of eighteen, young Americans are called
upon to bear arms," this was the age at which "Americans are treated
as adults before many courts of law and are held responsible for their
acts." 2 2 3 It was the former consideration that caused Congress to act
on the President's suggestion. During World War H, the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940 set the draft age minimum at
twenty-one years. 224 However, in late 1942, the draft age was lowered
to eighteen. 225 Historically, the states set the voting age for federal
elections at twenty-one; this meant that men between the ages of eigh-
teen and twenty could be drafted into the military, but did not have a
voice in elections.
219. See id. ("States may still impose poll taxes, however, as a requirement to vote
in other state and local elections.").
220. 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
221. Id. at 668-69 (citing Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937)). Indeed,
Breedlove was cited by legislators and quoted during debates over both the 1942 and
1944 soldier voting bills. See, e.g., 88 CONG. REc. 6932 (1942) (discussing Breed-
love); see also id. at 6555 (quoting Breedlove); 90 CONG. Riic. 813 (1944) (citing and
quoting Breedlove).
222. Special Message to Congress: "To Vote at Eighteen-Democracy Fulfilled and
Enriched," I PUB. PAPERS 751, 752 (June 27, 1968).
223. Id.
224. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, § 2, 54 Stat.
885, 885.
225. C.P. Trussell, Shorn Draft Bill Passed by House, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1942, at
18.
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At the time Johnson made his appeal to Congress, approximately
twenty-five percent of the American forces fighting in Vietnam were
under the age of twenty-one, and twenty-nine percent of the war's
casualties were accounted for by men between the ages of eighteen
and twenty.226 Initially, Congress passed a law to amend the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 to lower the voting age to eighteen in federal,
state, and local elections. 227 In so doing, Congress stated that the age
requirement denied and abridged "the inherent constitutional rights of
citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age to
vote-a particularly unfair treatment of such citizens in view of the
national defense responsibilities imposed upon such citizens." 228 That
this amendment was made in response to Vietnam was evident. How-
ever, a sharply divided Supreme Court ruled that Congress lacked the
power to set an age limit for state and local elections. 229 In response,
Congress once again utilized its power to amend the Constitution to
achieve its suffrage goals. In the most rapid ratification process in
American history, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment became a part of the
Constitution in 1971, thus establishing a universal voting age of
eighteen. 2 30
Nearly thirty years after the Soldier Voting Acts of 1942 and
1944, Congress had built a foundation to fortify the voting rights of
those in the armed services. Nevertheless, problems have persisted.
C. Soldier Voting Rights Today
After World War II, overseas military personnel continued to
face difficulties with casting absentee ballots. It was not until 1986,
226. Lowering the Voting Age to 18: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 23 (1968) (statement
of R. Spencer Oliver, President, Young Democratic Clubs of America).
227. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10702 (2014)).
228. Id. § 301(a)(1).
229. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970). Justice Black delivered the judg-
ment of the Court, and expressed his own view of the case. See id. Justices Douglas
and Harlan both filed separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at
135 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 152 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan,
White, and Marshall dissented in part and concurred in part. Id. at 229. Justice Stewart
concurred in part and dissented in part; and Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black-
mun joined Justice Stewart. Id. at 281.
230. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment simply reads: "The right of citizens of the
United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age." U.S. CONST. amend.
XXVI; see also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED His-
TORY OF1 DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 228 (2000) ("The ratification process
was by far the most rapid in the history of the republic.")
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when Congress passed the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee
Voting Act ("UOCAVA") that action was taken to improve the absen-
tee voting process. 2 3 1 This Act protected service members' right to
vote in federal elections regardless of where they were stationed at the
time. 2 3 2 Implementation of UOCAVA by the states was slow, which
made additional legislation necessary. 2 3 3
In 2009, Congress passed the Military and Overseas Voter Em-
powerment ("MOVE") Act of 2009, which required states to amend
their election laws to ensure that overseas military personnel could
cast votes electronically.234 It also required states to transmit validly
requested absentee ballots to UOCAVA voters within forty-five days
of a federal election, except where the state was granted a waiver by
the Department of Defense.235 Since the passage of MOVE, the De-
partment of Justice has filed five lawsuits (against Wisconsin, Guam,
New York, New Mexico, and Illinois) alleging non-compliance with
provisions of the statute.236 According to Donald Inbody, some of the
same problems that plagued overseas voting during World War H-
such as "getting a marked ballot back to the right precinct in time to
be counted"-continue to the present day. 2 3 7 Inbody estimates that in
the 2012 presidential election, two hundred and fifty thousand over-
seas and military personnel who wanted to vote were prevented from
doing so due to an inability to "navigate the system." 238
CONCLUSION
After serving as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expedi-
tionary Force, orchestrating the Allied invasion of Normandy, and
working to end the Second World War with an Allied victory, Dwight
Eisenhower considered running for President in 1952.239 While on the
campaign trail, General Eisenhower declared, "I believe if a man is
231. Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (1986) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C.
§§ 20301-20311 (2014)).
232. See id. § 102.
233. Donald S. Inbody, Should Soldiers' Votes Get Counted? That's Not as Easy as
You'd Think, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/1/ensuring-soldiers-a-chance-to-vote-was-a-challenge-in-
the-civil-war-it-still-is-today/.
234. Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 577, 123 Stat. 2190, 2319 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20302
(2014)).
235. See id. § 579(a)(1)(c); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet:
Move Act (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheet-move-act.
236. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 235.
237. Inbody, supra note 233.
238. Id.
239. EISENHOWER, supra note 143, at 211.
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old enough to fight he is old enough to vote." 2 4 0 There can be little
doubt that this sentiment was fueled by his experience in Europe,
commanding hundreds of thousands of young men who were fighting
to preserve democracy but were deprived of a meaningful opportunity
to vote.
The Soldier Voting Acts of 1942 and 1944 fell short of their ob-
jective of making it simple for everyone in the services to cast a ballot.
The 1942 Act included no provision for overseas voters, but it made
an extraordinary leap toward racial equality when it exempted ser-
vicepeople from paying a poll tax at a time when Supreme Court pre-
cedent clearly upheld the use of the tax as a condition precedent to
voting. 241 The 1944 Act enabled more people to vote, but it aban-
doned the poll tax exemption and affirmed the power of the states to
make determinations about which votes would be counted. 242 Both
statutes were products of their times. When eight states had poll taxes
on their books, 2 4 3 and even more states' representatives cleaved to
their belief in white superiority, 244 it is not surprising that the 1944
legislation omitted the progressive ideal of making the ballot box col-
orblind. It took nearly two decades after the 1944 Soldier Voting Act
for the law to catch up with the intrepid Congress of 1942. And when
it happened, it came about through the unusual combination of a con-
stitutional amendment to prohibit the use of the poll tax in federal
elections, and a Supreme Court decision requiring the same of state
elections. 245
The sense that those sent to war should have a voice in state and
federal elections was the prevailing sentiment in Congress in 1942 and
1944. Most believed that a person willing to risk his or her life for the
country clearly merited a stake in plotting the country's future path.
Yet, Congress could not pass a simple voting bill because prejudice
got in its way. Requiring registration in person allowed a voting offi-
cial to observe the race of a prospective voter, and the poll tax effec-
tively disenfranchised a large class of African Americans who lived in
240. See Henry J. Abraham, Reduce the Voting Age to 18?, 43 NAT'L MUN. REV. IH,
12 (1954).
241. Soldier Voting Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-712, § 2, 56 Stat. 753, 753; see
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (upholding a Georgia statute that levied a
poll tax upon males between the ages of twenty-one and sixty).
242. See Act of Apr. 1, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-277, 58 Stat. 136.
243. See 88 CONG. REC. 6935 (1942) (noting that eight states still had poll tax
legislation).
244. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
245. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 668 (1966).
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a society that denied them upward social mobility and access to jobs
paying fair wages. At a time when America was fighting against Hitler
and all he stood for-including Hitler's "racial science," which dic-
tated that the Aryan race was superior to all otherS246-Americans
were unable to agree that a person wearing a military uniform could
vote irrespective of the color of his or her skin. As one senator ob-
served during debates in 1942, "while we are preaching to the world
the sentiments and the spirit of democracy and non-discrimination, we
are patently practicing discrimination against our poor people at
home." 24 7
The right to vote has been a cherished privilege for those who
enjoy life under a democratic form of government. Yet obstacles have
been placed before the ballot box, and those in the armed services
have faced unique difficulties in exercising their right to vote. The
Soldier Voting Acts passed in 1942 and 1944 have largely been for-
gotten, but the advances made helped pave the way for later legisla-
tion that further broadened soldier suffrage. However, an effective
soldier ballot has not yet been implemented, and until one is, those in
uniform will continue to be deprived of one of the fundamental rights
for which they are fighting. Silencing these potential voters weakens
the virtue of democratic elections. For, in the words of President John-
son, "when America has extended the vote to citizens whose hour has
come, new vitality has been infused into the life-stream of the nation,
and America has emerged the richer." 24 8
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